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PREAMBLE
Our world changed drastically on February 11th 2020 when the World Health Organization announced the name of the new coronavirus disease as COVID-19, and the pandemic was later considered the greatest challenge we have faced since World War II. Although we have started to experience social life in various new ways, the impacts that it will bring are still 
unknown. In recent years, migration had already undergone different transformations globally, and 
more changes are expected. How will populations on the move and migrant populations live in the 
following years post-COVID, and how different actors will respond to these changes, is yet to be seen. 
The Seminar Migration, Inequality and Public Policies at El Colegio de México has worked over 
the last three years on better understanding the different dimensions of inequality associated to mi-
gration, and how public policy mediates these processes. Facing this new context, we decided to gen-
erate an academic discussion, albeit accessible to the general public, to apprise how COVID-19 will 
impact different dimensions of migration processes, and reflect on what would be needed to address 
these effects. In order to ponder these questions, we brought together the perspectives of a series of 
binational experts from the academia, the public, social and private sectors, who deliver, on the one 
hand, a discussion about the economic, political and social context, and on the other, considerations 
on specific vulnerable mobile populations, as well as of support networks, and implications for policy 
aimed at diminishing the negative effects of the pandemic. We hope that these two issues of our series 
Notes on Migration and Inequalities will constitute a frame of reference to inform about the current 
situation and generate proposals that will transcend this contingency. 
CLAUDIA MASFERRER
Coordinator
Seminar Migration, Inequality and Public Policies
El Colegio de México
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Old Challenges, Institutional Vacuums, and New Challenges  
in Managing Migration Flows to Mexico 
Silvia E. Giorguli |  El Colegio de México
There have been recurring news stories about 
the situation of international migrants around 
the world in the news coverage of the pandemic. 
These are not the ones that attract most atten-
tion precisely because one of the effects of this 
health contingency has been the tendency to turn 
towards the local, find the closest and most ur-
gent needs and set global problems aside. Nev-
ertheless, showcasing the situation international 
migrants face in the pandemic will allow us to see 
discrimination (in a moment in which the travel-
er, the migrant, the foreigner is seen as a potential 
source of spread), overcrowding, and the poor 
sanitary conditions of migrants and their families 
in migration stations or centers, and the problems 
they face in order to access health services –both 
because their work situation doesn’t give them 
access to benefits and possibly because their un-
documented status prevents or inhibits them from 
seeking medical assistance. At the same time, we 
have seen several news stories about the role of 
international migrants in areas such as caregiving 
(for the elderly, for example) in contexts like the 
European one, or their importance in agriculture 
and in the food processing industry in the United 
States. In the face of their recurrent vulnerability, 
which has increased, the essential quality of their 
silent presence also stands in contrast. 
This is not a distant or alien problem to the 
Mexican context. In fact, there are adversities re-
lated to the pandemic in each of the dimensions 
of Mexico as a country of origin, of arrival, of 
return, of transit or of refuge, as well as having 
to do with the policies followed by the region’s 
countries vis-à-vis the pandemic. At the time of 
writing, the news story about the first death of 
a Mexican national in a U.S. managed detention 
center appeared. Likewise, we were surprised at 
the beginning of the health contingency by the 
news of violent acts in migration stations on the 
southern border, or by images of vulnerability in 
places where Central American immigrants await 
the opportunity to cross “north,” whether be-
cause their asylum claim was accepted or because 
they found another way to cross. 
From the Mexican perspective, what we are 
observing is the result of the vacuums, inefficien-
cies, and unresolved problems in migration man-
agement, mainly in our country, but also in the 
United States. The health contingency exacerbat-
ed them; it reveals vulnerabilities more starkly. It 
also puts forth the Mexican incapacity to define a 
migration management strategy suitable with the 
principles we have subscribed to through several 
international agreements. 
It is difficult to anticipate migration scenari-
os. At the same time, the challenges to manage 
migration seem too big. Nevertheless, there are 
aspects for which we can define concrete actions, 
pondering the ways in which the health contin-
gency has shown and increased international mi-
grants’ vulnerabilities. Below, I selectively depict 
three examples linked to different types of human 
mobility in Mexico.
1. Return migration and access to health 
The economic recession in the United States from 
only ten years ago, combined with the current re-
strictive migration policy, generated an important 
amount of returning Mexicans, the largest one in 
decades. Mexico was not ready, and we observed 
problems derived from lack of clear procedures 
and bureaucratic obstacles that hindered migrants’ 
access to education and health services, work, 
housing, and banking.1 The economic contingen-
cy expected after the emergency –accompanied by 
the anti-immigrant climate favored by Trump’s 
government- anticipates another important num-
ber of Mexican returnees to the country. This re-
turn will take place during a period of transition 
in the Mexican health system. The Seguro Popular 
insurance, which returning migrants could access 
for 90 days, stopped operating and it is unclear 
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how migrants can access the recently created 
National Health and Wellness Institute (INSABI, 
acronym in Spanish). We know a group of Mexi-
cans returning to the country will require special 
services for their chronic degenerative diseases2. 
It is crucial to have a clear health access struc-
ture that anticipates the challenges and needs of 
the population in the face of a recurring wave of 
respiratory illnesses associated with COVID-19.
2. Migrant children and adolescents 
One of the peculiarities of last decade’s migra-
tion flows is the presence of underage popula-
tion.3 This is observed both in returning migrants 
as well as in migrants in transit in Mexico, and 
among asylum seekers here or in the U.S.A. Mi-
grant children and adolescents travel accompa-
nied by family members and sometimes alone. 
There is a legal loophole in these cases that lim-
its the possibility of protecting migrant children, 
from the moment of their detention through the 
management of procedures related to them –
whether for deportation or asylum. Concrete ac-
tions are required to protect the best interest of 
the child by generating safe and adequate spaces 
while their migratory situation is being deter-
mined, and that allows families to stay together. 
Likewise, adequate attention is needed regarding 
migrant children’s health needs –including con-
sidering preventive actions like vaccination. 
3. Waiting time and life conditions during the 
processing of migration documents in Mexico 
and the United States
The crisis has displayed the precarious life con-
ditions of migrants in transit through Mexico 
and the vulnerability they face, especially during 
health contingencies like the current one. There 
are no adequate spaces in migration stations; in 
many cases, they are overcrowded and overpop-
ulated. In the case of migrants awaiting a resolu-
tion to their asylum claim to the United States, 
they are often temporarily located in irregular 
settlements in border cities. Concrete measures 
are needed to reduce bureaucratic paperwork 
and waiting times, both in Mexico and the United 
States.4 Likewise, actions could be taken in order 
to foster better living conditions in temporary set-
tlements following examples and protocols from 
other countries. 
There is no doubt that the challenges Mexi-
co faces in terms of migration management are 
huge and are linked both to the country’s poli-
cies as well as to deficiencies and vacuums in the 
U.S. migration system. Creative solutions which 
can effectively break the accumulated inertias 
in migration management are required. Perhaps 
one could begin deconstructing the several prob-
lems and anticipate them as much as possible in 
the different scenarios once the contingency is 
over. 
NOTES
1 S. Giorguli and A. Bautista, (in press), Derechos fragmentados: Acceso a derechos sociales y migración de retorno a 
México, (México: El Colegio de México).
2 N. Castañeda-Camey, X. Castañeda, V. Díaz, C. Ruiz and Alonzo O. (in press). “Salud y derechos de los migrantes 
mexicanos retornados: barreras, acciones y oportunidades,” in Derechos fragmentados: Acceso a derechos sociales y 
migración de retorno a México eds. S. Giorguli and A. Bautista (México: El Colegio de México). 
3 In the case of children coming from the Unites States to Mexico, see Zúñiga and Giorguli (2019) and Masferrer et al. 
(2019). V. Zúñiga V. & S. Giorguli, Niñas y niños en la migración de Estados Unidos a México la generación 0.5. (México: 
El Colegio de México, 2019). C. Masferrer, E. Hamilton and N. Denier, “Immigrants in Their Parental Homeland: Half a 
Million U.S.-born Minors Settle Throughout Mexico,” Demography, 56 1453-1461, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-019-
00788-0.
4 Coria and Zamudio (2018) present a detailed analysis of Mexico’s legal framework and the challenges we face. E. Coria 
and P. Zamudio, “Inmigrantes y refugiados ¿Mi casa es tu casa?,” Documentos de Política Migratoria, (México: Centro 
de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, 2018). https://migdep.colmex.mx/publicaciones/DPM-03.pdf. For the United 
States, Meissner et al. (2018), define the system as “broken,” inoperative and not effective. D. Meissner, F. Hipsman, T.A. 
Aleinikoff, (2018). “The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: Charting a Way Forward,” (Washington D.C.: Migration Policy 
Institute, 2018).
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The Pandemic and Migration Policies on the  
Mexico-United States Border
Andrew Selee |  Migration Policy Institute
The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed changes 
on mobility at a global level, from the closing of 
borders, flight prohibitions and visa restrictions 
and access to asylum. With the purpose of limit-
ing movement and promoting social distancing to 
prevent the spread, many of these measures make 
sense. But there are reasons to believe that in 
some cases, including some decisions by the U.S. 
government, these measures might become more 
permanent or give way to other efforts to restrict 
migration that President Trump’s administration 
has wanted for a very long time. While it is still 
difficult to distinguish between what’s necessary 
due to the crisis and what could become perma-
nent because of other political reasons, using the 
crisis as an excuse, it’s worth starting to draw the 
spheres in which we are seeing changes that could 
last much longer than the epidemiological situa-
tion would suggest.
One of the strongest measures was the par-
tial closure of the border to non-essential traffic. 
This was agreed by the U.S. and Mexican govern-
ments, as well as by the U.S. and Canadian gov-
ernments for their shared border, and it has a very 
understandable logic to try and reduce traffic that 
is not for work, education or medical purposes. 
The difficulty about this measure lies in the fact 
that much of the work transit happens outside 
of official margins, so many Mexican workers 
who live on the Mexican side work informally on 
the U.S. side doing housework, landscaping, ag-
riculture and in other sectors where informality 
prevails. These workers, who cannot prove they 
have a job on the other side of the border, are 
currently unemployed and will depend on the fu-
ture opening of mobility in the border. It’s likely 
that this will happen when both countries start to 
limit their social distancing measures, since it’s a 
well thought measure, negotiated and implement-
ed within the parameters of the pandemic. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s unilater-
al measure of returning undocumented migrants 
and asylum seekers to Mexico, implemented for 
health reasons, might last longer than the current 
crisis. Instead of following regular detention pro-
cedures, the U.S. government announced that it 
would use a little known health authority to re-
turn undocumented migrants and asylum seekers 
and Central Americans directly to Mexico, with-
out registering them as detainees or taking them 
to a detention center. The Mexican government 
accepted this measure (supposedly, under a lot of 
pressure), but refused to receive nationals from 
countries that were not from Central America 
and Mexico. Now, the U.S. government returns 
undocumented migrants in less than two hours, 
an express process, and has no asylum facilities. 
This measure can also be understood in the 
midst of a pandemic. The risk of having thou-
sands of migrants in detention centers was sig-
nificant, and even though the risk is still latent on 
the Mexican side, with returnees, it’s better than 
a restricted space. But it is also likely that the U.S. 
administration might have attained a goal for the 
longer term which had nothing to do with the 
pandemic, which is to eliminate access to the asy-
lum system in the border and to stop almost all ir-
regular crossings. I suspect that while COVID-19 
lasts, this measure will be in force in the border, 
even though other measures that restrict mobility 
within the country and in the border will be sus-
pended. To some of the U.S. President’s advisors, 
the pandemic gave them what they yearned for: 
a way to seal the border to illegal crossings and 
eliminate the asylum process there. 
The third measure, and another one that could 
stay beyond the crisis, is the decision to pause 
during two months the emission of permanent vi-
sas -green cards- to beneficiaries that are outside 
the country and who are being claimed by rela-
tives. It is a reduced number, with a few excep-
tions, and probably does not go beyond 52,000 
affected people per month. In the short term, 
the number of affected people is even less, since 
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consulates have been closed and unable to pro-
cess visas. Nevertheless, there are many possi-
bilities that this measure is renewed beyond the 
contemplated two months, therefore limiting new 
legal entries to the country.
Since the majority of Mexicans that are going 
to live in the United States these days do so le-
gally, precisely through these permanent visas, it’s 
very likely that this will have a bigger effect on 
Mexican families living in the United States and 
their families in Mexico, who are waiting to be 
reunited with them north of the border. However, 
the measure left out those who have been claimed 
by their employers and temporary workers, which 
suggests that the Trump administration sees those 
who are going to the United States to work in a 
very different way than those who are entering 
for family reunification. 
These are not the only migration measures 
that have been taken in times of COVID-19, but 
they are probably the three with the most impact 
on the Mexico-U.S. border and migration be-
tween the two countries. While it is probable that 
the measure that limits traffic along the border is 
cancelled at some point, when the circumstances 
allow, there are reasons to believe that the other 
two measures, one with irregular crossings and 
one with resident visas, might last much longer. 
It should not surprise us that the leaders of 
many countries will use the current crisis to jus-
tify measures in other areas of public policy that 
were already on their agendas. These will not be 
the only migration and other measures imple-
mented for emergency reasons, but they will find 
a certain higher permanence even when the cri-
sis has decreased. Crises give government execu-
tives ample margin to act in favor of the common 
good, but some of the measures turn out to be 
less temporary than others. In this case, some of 
the U.S. government’s temporary migration mea-
sures will probably have longer lives than the of-
ficial reasons behind them. 
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Employment and Migration in Mexico in Times of COVID-19 
Liliana Meza |  Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía
Carla Pederzini |  Universidad Iberoamericana
One of the main effects produced by the expan-
sion of coronavirus in Mexico has been the de-
crease in economic activity and consequently, the 
decrease in employment. Adding to the pandem-
ic’s effect is the negative performance that both 
the country’s economy and employment had al-
ready been experiencing. In January this year, 
before the first COVID-19 case came up, the In-
ternational Labour Organization (ILO) had al-
ready estimated an increase in unemployment in 
2020 and 2021. Furthermore, economic activity 
in Mexico decreased -0.1 in 2019, which means 
there was already a decrease before the pandemic.
Since the spread of the virus in Mexico, social 
distancing measures have been implemented in 
order to minimize it. On March 23rd, the Mexi-
can government suspended classes, forbade gath-
erings with more than 100 people and suspended 
economic activities involving social mobility. The 
main motivation to implement these measures is 
that the health system can maintain its capacity 
to care for the sick needing hospital treatment, 
therefore containing the mortality rate. 
In comparison with previous recessions in 
Mexico, this crisis will have a relatively bigger 
impact in employment. As a consequence of sus-
pending work, many companies have been forced 
to stop operating due to a substantial fall in the 
demand of their products or due to isolation, 
while others have been reorganizing to be able to 
work from home, as much as possible. 
Isolation means a lower demand for labor and, 
most likely, the substitution of work by robots 
and digital apps, a situation in which low skilled 
labor is the most affected. On the other hand, the 
higher skilled labor is more complementary with 
technology; it is more susceptible to do be done 
at a distance, may have better isolation measures, 
and workers with these skills may have better 
conditions to work from home. Therefore, in 
Mexico, lower skilled work is the most affected 
one due to social distancing. 
Regarding women’s employment, the fact that 
their work is more complementary with technol-
ogy could affect them relatively less. Neverthe-
less, it has been found that, with social distancing, 
women have been absorbing a higher workload 
of domestic work, such as caring for children 
who aren’t going to school. This relatively larger 
workload could lead to a fall in women’s pro-
ductivity that offsets the positive effect of higher 
complementarity with technology.
On the other hand, the effect of social distanc-
ing at work will be very different depending on 
the economic sector: while tourism, the entertain-
ment industry, as well as aviation will be severely 
affected in the short term, other sectors like medi-
cal services, food manufacturing and telecommu-
nications will be favored due to the health crisis.
For more than 15 million Mexicans in the in-
formal sector (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y 
Empleo, fourth trimester, 2019), staying at home 
and following the social distancing measures rec-
ommended by the government will mean not gener-
ating an income that allows them to survive day by 
day. Many have to decide between being exposed 
to the virus or being hungry. It is very likely that 
this sector will be much more exposed to the effects 
of the virus and will also suffer a decrease in their 
income due to the economic crisis generated by dis-
tancing measures. The effects of the crisis will be 
disproportionately higher in this economic sector. 
Another challenge that the Mexican econo-
my will face will be the return of Mexicans from 
the United States, who will be affected by unem-
ployment in that country, especially because the 
health crisis affects sectors in which migrants 
are traditionally employed, such as construction, 
restaurants and hotels. In out-migration areas, 
the return of people not only means pressure on 
the local job market, but it also poses an epide-
miological challenge due to risk of infection, in 
places with scarce medical services. In addition, 
there is a decline in remittances due to returnees, 
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as well as the income decrease of migrants in the 
United States. 
Job loss in Mexico could also lead to many 
Mexicans considering migration towards the 
United States as the only way to recover an in-
come for their families, despite the pandemic 
exacerbating xenophobic reactions in the Unit-
ed States and the tougher border controls. This 
could have the effect of stimulating irregular mi-
gration towards the north. 
On the other hand, the effects of the pandem-
ic will also generate strong pressure over the 
already weak Central American economies and 
their labor markets and thus, over migration. It is 
very likely that migration flows towards Mexico 
increase, posing a challenge for our country to 
handle them without impairing migrants’ human 
rights and controlling the pandemic, in an en-
vironment that fosters the intensification of an-
ti-immigrant reactions.
The pandemic has taught us that there are no 
limits to its spread and that the wellbeing of a 
sector of the population depends on the wellbe-
ing of others. Now more than ever it is necessary 
to implement strategies that, while avoiding the 
stigmatization of the most vulnerable popula-
tion, help maintain a minimum level of wellbeing 
through well-designed economic and social pol-
icies that include, among other things, uncondi-
tional transfers to those most in need. 
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Migration, Inequality and COVID-19: Implications for Mexican 
Immigrants in the United States*
Pia M. Orrenius |  Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Madeline Zavodny |  University of North Florida
Yichen Su |  Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
*  The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
or the Federal Reserve System.
While people all around the world have been hard 
hit by the economic downturn resulting from the 
COVID-19 pandemic, immigrants are especially 
vulnerable. This note explores the initial economic 
impact of the pandemic on Mexican immigrants 
in the United States, with a particular focus on 
Texas, and discusses the key immigration-related 
challenges posed for policy makers and research-
ers going forward.
Mexican immigrants in more   
vulnerable industries
A large share of Mexican immigrants worked in 
sectors that have largely shut down in the wake 
of the pandemic, most notably restaurants. Prior 
to the crisis, over 10 percent of employed Mex-
ican immigrants were working at restaurants; in 
Texas, the share was slightly smaller at about 9 
percent.1 Mexican immigrants are also over-rep-
resented in construction, and many building 
projects have been put on hold or scrapped as 
a result of the pandemic. Most of these workers 
have either been furloughed or seen their hours 
drastically cut. Some Mexican immigrants work 
in essential sectors that have not been adverse-
ly affected and remain employed, such as those 
working in landscaping or agriculture. On the 
whole, however, social distancing mandates have 
proven very harmful to Hispanic immigrants. In 
fact, fewer than one in eight Mexican-born work-
ers in Texas has a job that can easily be done from 
home.2
The COVID-19 pandemic and resultant eco-
nomic downturn is likely to worsen the economic 
status of many Mexican immigrants and exacer-
bate income inequality. Low-wage workers are 
disproportionately concentrated in sectors that 
have been more affected by shutdown orders and 
a collapse in demand. Families headed by a Mex-
ican immigrant were more likely to be poor even 
before COVID-19. And, as discussed next, the 
fact that many Mexican immigrant families are 
not eligible for the temporary expansions to the 
safety net means those families will become even 
worse off than other families.
Relief in sight?
The U.S. safety net is intended to help families 
who face an unexpected setback, including los-
ing a job. The unemployment insurance system 
provides payments to qualified workers who lose 
a job or see their hours cut through no fault of 
their own. Workers must be “covered” by the 
system, however; unauthorized immigrants and 
people working “off the books” are not covered. 
About 43 percent of the 11.3 million Mexican 
immigrants are unauthorized (4.9 million), while 
the rest either hold green cards (3.5 million) or 
are naturalized U.S. citizens (2.3 million).3 Less 
than 5 percent have DACA (Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals) status.
The federal government expanded unemploy-
ment insurance coverage in mid-March 2020 to 
include many self-employed workers (and added 
a supplemental benefit of $600 per week for four 
months), but it did not include unauthorized im-
migrants. Only legal workers—typically U.S. cit-
izens and legal permanent residents—can receive 
unemployment insurance benefits. States decide 
whether to include recipients of DACA and other 
similar legal statuses in the unemployment insur-
ance program; Texas has done so.4
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The other major federal relief program cre-
ated in response to COVID-19—one-time cash 
payments of up to $1200 per eligible adult and 
$500 per child—also excludes unauthorized im-
migrants. Further, U.S. citizens, legal immigrants 
and DACA recipients who file their federal in-
come taxes jointly with a spouse who uses an In-
dividual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) 
are not eligible for the payments. ITINs are often 
associated with undocumented immigrants since 
people who use an ITIN typically do so because 
they have no Social Security number.
While federal funds are not available to unau-
thorized immigrants, states can opt to fund relief 
measures at their own expense. California has 
been the only state thus far to announce a relief 
fund for unauthorized immigrants. Texas seems 
unlikely to create such a program even though it 
is second only to California in its estimated num-
ber of unauthorized immigrants (some 1.6 mil-
lion, including 1.1 million from Mexico).5
There are valid reasons for excluding unau-
thorized immigrants from many governmental 
transfer programs. After all, governments do not 
want to undermine the rule of law or potentially 
incentivize unauthorized immigration. The ex-
treme nature of the current situation with a pan-
demic and widespread mandated business clo-
sures may weaken such concerns about incentive 
effects; extending some benefits to unauthorized 
immigrants right now is unlikely to create expec-
tations of similar benefits in more normal times. 
Nonetheless, giving benefits to unauthorized im-
migrants is a tough sell politically, and perhaps 
more so when many voters are facing difficult fi-
nancial situations. 
Hiring immigrants in the recovery
The current situation has interesting but conflict-
ing implications for the eventual economic re-
covery. A major economic rationale for limiting 
access to transfer programs and keeping benefit 
levels relatively low is to incentivize work. The 
current unprecedented supplement to unemploy-
ment benefits ($600 extra per week for 4 months) 
effectively removes the incentive to work for laid-
off low-wage workers. Who then will be willing to 
fill the jobs at grocery stores, warehouses, delivery 
services and the like created by rapidly expanding 
demand in those sectors or at restaurants when 
they reopen? Perhaps immigrants who are unfa-
miliar with the unemployment insurance system 
or ineligible for benefits, some of them unautho-
rized. However, many of the jobs being created 
right now are at large corporate chains that use the 
E-Verify system to check their hires’ employment 
eligibility. Whether such businesses continue to use 
the E-Verify system will be interesting to see.
Agenda for policy makers and researchers
Addressing the public health threat posed by 
COVID-19 is clearly the top priority for poli-
cy makers. Reducing the economic fallout from 
the business shutdowns is also critical. But even 
with these priorities and record federal spending 
to help households and businesses, some groups 
have been strategically left out. 
The economic vulnerability of Mexican immi-
grants in particular and the exclusion of many 
of them from expanded safety net programs will 
result in more poverty and income inequality. 
For researchers, this is an opportunity to exam-
ine how ineligible immigrants fare and shed light 
on the social costs of crises among this group. It 
is also an opportunity to study how immigrants 
with legal residence and U.S. natives respond 
to relief programs compared with workers who 
are not eligible for them. For example, will im-
migrants who are ineligible for jobless benefits 
be the first to return to work? And if not, is that 
because they are thwarted by programs such as 
E-Verify? The results of that research may affect 
policy making as the pandemic continues and 
once the recovery gets underway.
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1 Authors’ calculations based on March 2019 through February 2020 Current Population Survey data. 
2 Authors’ calculations based on O*NET data applied to 2013–2017 American Community Survey data; see https://
www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2020/0407 for the U.S. and Texas more generally.
3 See https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-united-states.
4 See https://www.nelp.org/publication/immigrant-workers-eligibility-unemployment-insurance/ and https://www.vox.
com/2020/4/1/21197017/immigrants-coronavirus-stimulus-relief-bill.
5 See https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/TX.
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Thoughts about some of the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic  
on Remittances at a World Level
Mario Hernández |  Western Union
Along with seemingly every other business in 
the world, Western Union has spent the last few 
months considering the effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic on our operations, and, more impor-
tantly, on the millions of customers all over the 
world who depend on us for rapid, efficient trans-
fer of money.
Unlike most other businesses, however, West-
ern Union has a unique perspective due to our 
long history of serving distressed communities 
in times of crisis; our worldwide reputation has 
been built, in large part, on bringing people to-
gether when conditions are at their worst and 
people need their loved ones the most. Our his-
tory of serving such needs, as well as our glob-
al reach and combination of a digital and retail 
business, leaves us well positioned to spot a few 
signs pointing the way forward as global mi-
grants, our customers and our business embrace 
a New Normal:
• People will still send money, and digital accep-
tance is only accelerating
• People sending money online expect a high 
level of service, which encourages trust
• Cash and retail locations will still be needed in 
many parts of the world
• The COVID-19 crisis may serve as a new call 
for true financial inclusion
Western Union’s remittance business was, of 
course, impacted by COVID-19, with money 
sends falling in some areas. It is still too soon, 
however, to clearly distinguish between business 
falloff due to people sending less money vs. due 
to the large-scale lockdowns that kept them from 
visiting our retail Agents. At the end of April, the 
World Bank forecast a 20 percent decline in re-
mittances in 2020; while we feel that number is 
pessimistic, we are expecting remittance volumes 
to fall. As stay-in-place guidelines loosen and 
businesses around the world reopen, it will be 
easier to gauge whether people have less money 
to send home and how much.
We do know that people still have a strong 
desire to send money during hard times. During 
the 2008 global financial crisis, for example, we 
witnessed the resilience of our remittance-based 
business as our customers remained highly moti-
vated to support families and loved ones. 
COVID-19 has made one overarching trend 
for the remittance business clear, however: Digi-
tal transactions, particularly on the send side, are 
the future. Western Union has spent years build-
ing out a digital infrastructure to match our glob-
al brick-and-mortar network, leaving us well-pre-
pared for the surge in digital transactions we ex-
perienced as people looked for trusted, safer and 
more convenient ways to send money. 
Combine the rise in digital sends with our ex-
pansion of receive options—money into a bank 
account or mobile wallet in more than 100 
countries; near-real-time payout in 50 countries; 
and our longstanding cash payout at retail loca-
tions—and it’s easy to see that for customers in 
many corridors, all-digital transactions are likely 
to become the status quo. The rise in the number 
of digital send, digital-payout, and all-digital (on 
both ends) transactions portends, we feel, a larg-
er change in remittance behavior that we think 
is good news for remitting migrants around the 
world—with some important caveats.
First, while Western Union has long anticipat-
ed and fostered growth in digital transactions, we 
nevertheless were caught somewhat by surprise 
as so many longtime retail customers tried to use 
our digital services for the first time. The level of 
support they required quickly overwhelmed our 
customer-service networks and we fielded com-
plaints via social media and other means about 
wait times and know-your-customer require-
ments. Already-worried people were frustrated as 
they tried to find ways to send money to their 
loved ones far away. 
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Western Union responded quickly to these is-
sues, implementing a ‘Digital Location’ program 
that put a real person in touch with senders or 
receivers in 10 countries who needed help; we 
also beefed up our customer-care staffs with em-
ployees from other parts of the company, and 
implemented an automated system to help guide 
some customers through identification and other 
requirements to send and receive money. Finally, 
we updated our Agent Locator system three times 
a day to account for constant changes in open 
retail Agent locations and hours of operation.
This experience—though obviously made more 
severe by the pressing send-and-receive needs pre-
sented by the pandemic—made clear something 
we and many other businesses already knew: 
moving customers from a retail-based experience 
to a digital one is not as easy as pointing them 
to a website or asking them to download an app. 
When people’s health or well-being may depend 
on the fast, reliable receipt of money from their 
loved ones far away, stress, and expectations, rise. 
Particularly when it comes to serving less-digitally 
savvy populations, handling their money in a way 
that leaves them feeling respected and reassured 
requires more ‘touch’ than other kinds of trans-
actions. Native language support is particularly 
important.
The COVID-19 pandemic reinforced some-
thing we already knew: For all digital’s explosive 
growth, and the promises of safety, convenience 
and economy it brings for millions, in much of 
the world there is simply no replacement for local, 
brick-and-mortar Agents offering cash payouts.
As commonplace as virtual wallets and 
bank-account payout have become—even in 
less-developed parts of the world—they still re-
quire access to digital and financial services. As a 
company that holds financial inclusion and con-
necting the financially underserved to the global 
economy as core values, Western Union is as com-
mitted to serving a receiving customer in ‘off the 
grid’ rural Central America as we are to serving 
the corresponding sender, who may have online 
access and a bank account, in the US. This is why 
we continue to offer cash payout at more than 
550,000 retail locations all around the world, 
rather than only serving an easier-to-reach digital 
market in the most affluent countries.
Unequal access to technology and financial ser-
vices continue to hobble participation in the glob-
al economy for millions around the world; the 
COVID-19 crisis is just the latest, if an especially 
distressing, example. Western Union is proud to 
serve customers from all geographies and walks 
of life, but we know better than most that the 
benefits of the digital global economy still fall 
unevenly. One hopeful view of the still-unfolding 
COVID-19 crisis is that it may serve as an impetus 
for businesses, governments and NGOs to redou-
ble their efforts to address this inequity and make 
real financial inclusion a reality for everyone, re-
gardless of where they live—so that when the next 
crisis hits, help will be easier to send.
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Mexican Human Rights Organizations Respond to Protect Migrants 
during the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Gretchen Kuhner |  Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración 
As migrant rights organizations in Mexico ana-
lyzed the news of the coronavirus approaching at 
the beginning of March, it was difficult to imag-
ine what social distancing and “sheltering in” 
would look like for migrants. In the U.S., orga-
nizations were focused on supporting immigrants 
as essential workers in service and agricultural 
jobs on the frontlines. However, in Mexico, the 
challenge would be to provide basic protection 
to migrants in transit, in detention centers, those 
stuck along the southern and northern borders, 
and those waiting for resolutions to their asylum 
claims throughout the country. Organizations 
were unsure how the U.S. and Mexico would re-
act. Would the U.S. continue to deport Mexicans 
during a pandemic, risking their health? Would 
officials continue to place asylum seekers in the 
Remain in Mexico Program and return them to 
Mexico to await their hearings? Would Mexico 
put health concerns over U.S. political pressure?
By mid-March, two weeks before Mexico de-
clared a national health emergency, several of 
the more than 200 shelters and organizations 
had developed protocols to guide service provi-
sion and emergency aid throughout the pending 
shutdown. Many of the shelters decided to close 
their doors to new arrivals in order to protect 
the current population. They also lost hundreds 
of volunteers who returned home, creating staff-
ing shortages. Larger shelters set up quarantine 
sections in order to receive new migrants, includ-
ing many that would be released later from the 
65 detention centers in Mexico. Legal services 
and community-based organizations closed their 
doors and set up online consultations. 
Advocacy was a different story. Approximate-
ly 40 organizations and networks constructed a 
multi-pronged advocacy strategy based on inter-
national recommendations urging states to release 
migrants from detention and to include all people, 
irrespective of their nationality or immigration 
status, in public health responses. Organizations 
sent letters, signed petitions, published editorials, 
and appeared in local, national and internation-
al media.1 They initiated litigation to demand the 
release of migrant detainees and sent recommen-
dations for alternatives to detention to authori-
ties in the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as 
international organizations. 
By the third week in March, the policies of the 
U.S. and Mexico had become clear. On March 
20th, the U.S.-Mexico border was closed to 
non-essential travel and the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) issued an order establishing that 
all people crossing without proper documenta-
tion at, or between, ports of entry would be ex-
pelled to Mexico expeditiously or deported to 
their countries of origin without due process.2 
On March 22nd, the Mexican Foreign Ministry 
agreed to accept all Mexicans as well as up to 
100 nationals per day from Guatemala, Hondu-
ras and El Salvador.3 The order was implemented 
immediately and in the following days organiza-
tions documented as the Mexican government 
bussed Central Americans to the states of Tabas-
co and Chiapas at the southern border and left 
them stranded along highways to self-deport.4 At 
the same time, instead of releasing migrants from 
detention with immigration status and social as-
sistance, the Mexican Foreign Ministry pressured 
Central American governments to accept depor-
tations. Between March 20th and April 26th, the 
National Immigration Institute (INM) deported 
more than 3,600 migrants, leaving 106 in migra-
tion detention.5 Shelters with quarantine capacity 
received approximately 700 detainees with pend-
ing asylum cases through financial support from 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (UNHCR). 
During April, organizations continued to ad-
dress emerging humanitarian needs and to mon-
itor and document the impact of COVID-19 
-related policies in Mexico. Food and sanitation 
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supplies were distributed to migrants in shel-
ters and those holed up in rooms, apartments 
or homeless. When migrants in five detention 
centers protested lack of sanitary conditions, 
leading to the death of a Guatemalan asylum 
seeker, organizations filed complaints with the 
prosecutor´s office and the National Human 
Rights Commission (CNDH).6 Along the north-
ern border, shelters struggled to receive expelled 
migrants as well as Mexican deportees, some of 
whom were deported with COVID-19 after be-
coming infected in detention centers in the U.S. 
More than 20,000 people under the Remain in 
Mexico program had their asylum hearings post-
poned until at least June, leaving them in limbo in 
the middle of a pandemic, with organized crime 
devising new ways to exploit them.7 In the mean-
time, pending asylum claims increased by 33%, 
with over 65,000 people now waiting for adjudi-
cations that have been suspended by the Mexican 
Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR) 
until further notice.8 
The week of April 12th, the litigation began 
to have an impact when judges issued two in-
junctions ordering the INM to implement public 
health protocols in detention centers and to re-
lease all vulnerable migrants including children, 
the elderly, pregnant women and people with un-
derlying health conditions. One of the injunctions 
issued by a federal judge in Mexico City, ordered 
the INM to cease detention of vulnerable groups 
during the remainder of the pandemic, to issue hu-
manitarian visas and to provide healthcare services.9 
The immediate emergency measures combined 
with the longer-term documentation and liti-
gation have undoubtably saved many lives and 
placed migrant rights organizations in a position 
to demand accountability for the migration pol-
icies implemented by the Interior and Foreign 
Ministries throughout the pandemic in Mexico. 
In the longer term, organizations will continue 
to monitor the effects of the reactive migration 
policies enacted by the U.S. and Mexican gov-
ernments and the impact of the pandemic on mi-
grants in general. The economic crisis in the U.S. 
may lead to massive returns to Mexico as it did 
between 2008-2010, while a decrease in remit-
tances is expected to motivate further migration 
from Central America. Migrant rights organiza-
tions have confirmed in the last two months that 
the U.S. will use any pretext to close the border, 
even in violation of its own asylum laws and at 
the expense of human lives, and Mexico will con-
tinue to cower at the first provocation. 
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1 Colectivo de Observación y Monitoreo de Derechos Humanos en el Sureste et al. “Por el cuidado de todas y todos, in-
cluyendo las personas en contexto de movilidad ante la actual crisis humanitaria por el coronavirus COVID-19 mexicano” 
GTPM March 19, 2020. https://gtpm.mx/por-el-cuidado-de-todas-y-todos-incluyendo-las-personas-en-contexto-de- 
movilidad-ante-la-actual-crisis-humanitaria-por-el-coronavirus-covid-19/
2 Robert R. Redfield. “Extension of Order Suspending Introduction of Certain Personas from Countries Where a Commu-
nicable Disease Exists.” U.S Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
March 20, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/pdf/10-24-16-PRB-Members-Federal-Register-Notice-FY-2016-04- 
19-2020-p.pdf
3 Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. “Nota Informativa Relaciones EXTERIORES 11” Gobierno de México, March 21, 
2020. https://www.gob.mx/sre/documentos/nota-informativa-relaciones-exteriores-no-11
4 Movimiento Migrante Mesoamericano. “Trasladan a Honduras a Las Personas Migrantes Abandonadas Por INM En 
Tabasco,” MMMesoamericano. April 13, 2020. https://movimientomigrantemesoamericano.org/2020/04/13/trasladan-
a-honduras-a-las-personas-migrantes-abandonados-por-inm-en-tabasco/
5 Instituto Nacional de Migración. “Actúa INM con responsabilidad ante la contingencia por COVID-19,” Gobier-
no de México. April 26, 2020. https://www.gob.mx/inm/prensa/actua-inm-con-responsabilidad-ante-la-contingen-
cia-por-covid-19-241034.
6 El Financiero. “Muere guatemalteco tras motín en la estación migratoria de Tenosique, Tabasco.” El Financiero. April 1, 
2020. https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/muere-guatemalteco-tras-motin-en-la-estacion-migratoria-de-tenosique.
7 Homeland Security. “Joint DHS/EOIR Statement on MPP Rescheduling,” Homeland Security. April 30, 2020. https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2020/04/30/joint-dhseoir-statement-mpp-rescheduling.
8 Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados. “Solicitudes Estadística,” Gobierno de México. May 2, 2020 https://www.
gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/550490/ABRIL_2020___4-mayo-2020_.pdf
9 Sandra Cuffe. “Mexico Judge Orders Release of Migrants Vulnerable to Coronavirus,” Al Jazeera and News Agencies. April 
18, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/mexico-judge-orders-release-migrants-vulnerable-coronavirus- 
200419004324979.html.
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Lessons from the Pandemic: Poverty and Social Rights in Mexico 
Agustín Escobar Latapí |  Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social
Poverty and vulnerability are intimately linked to 
the pandemic that devastated the world in 2020. 
Initially, the pandemic was brought to Mexico by 
high class travelers and tourists. Nevertheless, it 
mostly killed poor Mexicans who can’t pay for 
private health services, keep a safe distance at 
home or abstain from social interaction given 
their type of work, who have faced decades of 
bad nutrition that provoked a high rate of chron-
ic diseases. Our society must exit the pandemic 
with a much more robust notion of solidarity. 
This new solidarity must pass the test that Fer-
rajoli calls, “the law of the weakest.”1 It should 
strengthen the most vulnerable.
Starting in 1930, Mexico built a system of 
programs and social services that mitigated in-
equalities. It strengthened and tended towards 
universality2 in most essential services. The poor-
est people had access to education, health, and 
other services, albeit lagging. In the liberal era 
that has governed us since 1986, the balance is 
mixed. Among the positive elements, resources 
for health and public education increased and a 
network of programs geared towards the poor-
est and most vulnerable was created. Among the 
negative elements, the justice system became al-
most completely inoperative and a great deal of 
basic urban services were privatized, and their 
prices raised. 
The system to provide these services, and to 
put in place actions and programs exists, albe-
it imperfect. There is a law that specifically un-
derscores the Mexican pact for social rights and 
therefore, signals the course the system should 
follow. I am referring to the General Law of So-
cial Development of 2004. This is a law of con-
sensus and sums: its overall framework was cre-
ated by the Democratic Revolution Party, but all 
parties contributed to it, and it was unanimous-
ly approved. That law is an example of political 
success. By capturing rights; laying the ground-
work for its independent study and measuring 
their implementation; defining the elements of its 
evaluation system; and allowing the creation of 
a counsel in charge of measuring and evaluating 
social development, this law gave Mexico what it 
needed to make progress in prioritizing the rights 
of the weakest. 
From the passing of the law until 2020, the 
framework of the law, the counsel created by it,3 
and the joint work by the public sector and inde-
pendent academics, allowed Mexico to progress 
in certain clear ways, but also to detect weak-
nesses that must be addressed. The pandemic 
must generate a reform informed by the Nation-
al Council for the Evaluation of Social Devel-
opment Policy (CONEVAL, Spanish acronym) 
studies and measurements oriented towards re-
constructing and strengthening basic services. In 
addition, a limited number of programs, designed 
with a life cycle viewpoint, could notably boost 
life conditions and opportunities for the poorest. 
The programs only make sense if fundamental 
services –in this essay I am proposing them to be 
health, education, order and justice4– come close 
to guaranteeing access to these rights. 
The first grand action is healthcare. During the 
thirties of the 20th century, after a decade of ef-
forts to consolidate a universal public health sys-
tem, the creation of the Instituto Mexicano del 
Seguro Social (IMSS) and other parallel systems 
segmented health services. The existence of seg-
mentation is not necessarily destructive. But it is 
fundamental to have a quality health service for 
those with the least means. The INSABI (Health 
for Wellbeing Institute, the present day universal 
health care system) does not fulfill that objective. 
Its inoperability during the pandemic has been ev-
ident. It also lacks the design elements needed for 
a segmented system to work. The Seguro Popular 
(program with similar objectives of past regimes) 
had deficiencies:5 there was no accountability for 
resources that should have been for state level 
health ministries and, in some cases, the public 
bids were corrupt; but its design is much better 
than INSABI, as well as its results. It is necessary 
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1 Luigi Ferrajoli, (coord.), Derecho y garantías, la ley del más débil (Madrid: Trotta, 1999).
2 Universality was never achieved.
3 Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy
4 The General Law of Social Development was negotiated and approved in 2004, after a long period of decreasing inci-
dents of violence in Mexico. I consider that that’s why property, order and justice are not mentioned. Violence and crime 
started to rise in 2007. If that law were to be updated, my proposal would be that these rights be included as social 
rights. Mexico’s poor are much poorer and more vulnerable because their access to these rights does not exist. 
5 See Agustín Escobar Latapí and Mercedes González de la Rocha (forthcoming), Acceso efectivo al desarrollo social: 
necropsia y lecciones de dos acciones públicas, (Ciudad de México: CIESAS).
to refinance and rebuild the system. In order to 
do that, there are international regulations that 
cover from the basic medical consultation pro-
tocols, through the transparent accreditation of 
clinics, and the definition of the amount of beds 
and medical staff required per population size. 
The Mexican government’s inaction in the dete-
rioration of public health and health services is un-
acceptable. Blaming the population for its co-mor-
bidity during the pandemic makes the State evade 
its responsibility over health. Rescuing health ser-
vice capacities is essential, as well as people hav-
ing healthy behaviors. The latter is achieved with 
education (which includes early nutrition, clean 
water in schools and real physical education), with 
salaries, which has advanced greatly in the past 
four years, and with an effective regulation of nu-
trition systems. The Mexican population’s terrible 
health condition (diabetes II, high blood pressure 
and obesity) is not a final curse. It is our social 
construct and it can be overcome. 
The second action item is education. Mexican 
education is very deficient. A wide group of spe-
cialists must redesign the system, which should 
emphasize self-health care and must really be 
functional in a context where distance learning 
will become a permanent part of the system. 
The third action item consists of the interaction 
of property, order and justice. The poor people’s 
living conditions can be explained in part by their 
lack of access to these three rights. Their lack of 
property isn’t only due to lack of resources, but 
also to the bureaucratic labyrinths they face. The 
perverse combination of lack of access to prop-
erty and to justice, in a context of overcrowding 
and terrible living quarters, partly explain their 
susceptibility in the pandemic. 
Once the mentioned social rights have been 
taken care of, and efficient systems safeguarded 
through working services are in place, economic 
and social gaps can be taken care of through spe-
cific programs that prevent the law of the stron-
gest from being prevalent in Mexico, and that, 
instead, substantially reduce inequality.
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Pandemic as Pretext: How the Trump Administration is  
Using a Public Health Crisis to End the Right to Asylum
Susan Gzesh |  University of Chicago
The characterization of immigrants and refugees 
as “diseased” has a long history in the United 
States. In 1917, U.S. immigration authorities be-
gan a decades-long regime of “disinfecting” Mex-
ican workers entering at land borders, using tox-
ic substances. In the early 20th century, working 
class immigrants from Asia and Eastern & South-
ern Europe were strictly inspected for “loathsome 
or dangerous” diseases, while first-class passen-
gers were not.1 In the 1990s, Haitians fleeing a 
murderous regime were suspected of carrying 
HIV/AIDs and diverted to a camp in Guantana-
mo, Cuba. Those who qualified for asylum were 
only allowed into the U.S. when a federal court 
ordered release from their off-shore “AIDS pris-
on.” 2 Now the COVID-19 pandemic has pro-
vided a pretext for the Trump Administration to 
implement some of its most extreme measures 
against people fleeing repression and violence –
whose rights to non-refoulement are protected by 
U.S. law and international human rights. 
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has en-
acted increasingly draconian measures to deter, 
block, or restrict access by asylum seekers and 
refugees. The quota of refugees lawfully admit-
ted from overseas was drastically cut. A travel 
ban was enacted against any entrants from cer-
tain countries (mostly Muslim). Trump’s advisors 
implemented a “detention as deterrence” policy 
against asylum seekers who had no alternative 
to entering the U.S. clandestinely or making their 
pleas at a land-border crossing. Immigration au-
thorities first stuffed migrant families into cages 
in freezing border stations and then filled deten-
tion centers with asylum seekers. The Adminis-
tration cruelly separated migrant children from 
their parents, tried to overturn judicially-man-
dated protections for unaccompanied youth, 
limited (“metered”) claims accepted at border 
crossings, sent claimants back into Mexico to 
await decisions, and attempted by regulation 
to bar any claim for asylum from unauthorized 
migrants who enter through the U.S.-Mexico 
border and had not applied for asylum in Mexi-
co. While some of these initiatives have been halt-
ed or limited by U.S. courts, many of them are 
still in place.3
Mexico has been complicit with Trump’s ini-
tiatives. Under economic pressure, Andres Man-
uel Lopez Obrador’s government blocks and de-
ports asylum seekers traveling through Mexico. 
Mexico has also accepted the return to its territo-
ry of Central American asylum seekers who made 
claims at the U.S. border. Under the so-called 
“Migrant Protection Protocols” over 50,000 ap-
plicants were to wait for their U.S. hearings in 
Mexico in conditions which threaten their lives.4
Now the COVID-19 pandemic has given the 
Trump Administration a pretext to stop asylum 
claims at the U.S.-Mexico border and increase 
pressure on asylum applicants already in the in-
terior of the U.S. The Trump Administration has 
suspended the hearings in the MPP cases, but 
will not allow MPP applicants to wait in the U.S. 
In U.S. cities with “stay at home” orders, other 
asylum applicants and their lawyers have been 
forced to show up for interviews and immigra-
tion court hearings, although non-essential func-
tions in almost all other U.S. courts have been 
suspended. Attorney organizations and immigra-
tion court judges and staff have sued to protest 
this health risk.5 The multiple pressures to make 
asylum seekers give up their claims are particu-
larly cruel violations of the fundamental right to 
non-refoulement under U.S. law and treaties rati-
fied by the U.S. and Mexico.6 
Immigration detention centers, including the 
more humane “shelters” for immigrant children, 
have become “hot spots” of COVID-19 infections, 
threatening the lives of both internees and staff.7 
Advocates from the National Immigrant Jus-
tice Center, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, and oth-
er NGOs, supported by Democrats in Congress, 
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have been unable to get a blanket release poli-
cy for asylum seekers from the Department of 
Homeland Security. Lawyers have sought to free 
detainees from ICE custody through time-con-
suming individual or group habeas corpus law-
suits in federal court. Some actions have been suc-
cessful while others have not. Increasingly judges 
are sympathetic to detainees’ plight and have or-
dered release, including children protected by the 
long-standing Flores court order.8 On April 20, 
2020, federal Judge Jesus Bernal issued a prelimi-
nary order on behalf of all ICE detainees that ICE 
begin reviewing the necessity for the detention of 
all detainees with COVID-19 risk factors and in-
stitute measures to protect all ICE detainees from 
infection by April 30, 2020.9 If the Trump Ad-
ministration continues to oppose alternatives to 
detention (electronic monitoring or other forms 
of supervised release) for asylum seekers, history 
may judge that the Administration turned facili-
ties detaining asylum seekers and other migrants 
into death campus. 
In a further expansion of disease-based ex-
clusions, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
issued a new regulation which cited over-crowd-
ed detention conditions (that the Department of 
Homeland Security created) as the rationale for 
immediate expulsion. The order “suspend[s] the 
introduction of certain persons” arriving at the 
Mexican or Canadian border, who likely would 
be placed in “congregate settings” where they 
would be “held in close proximity.” The order 
targets those who arrive by land, without valid 
travel documents. Instead of detaining them and 
allowing them the opportunity mandated in im-
migration law to express a “credible fear” of per-
secution, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
agents are directed to interrogate encountered 
persons in the field, to bypass normal immigra-
tion processing (which would entail detention), 
and expel them as rapidly as possible to “the 
country from which they came or their home 
country.” The CDC order and an accompanying 
leaked CBP memo do not allow any consideration 
of claims for political asylum and make an ex-
ception only for a person who manages to make 
“an affirmative, spontaneous, and reasonably be-
lievable claim that they will be tortured…” Exe-
cution of the order by CBP will violate U.S. law 
and international treaties including the Refugee 
Protocol and the Convention Against Torture.10
There are ways to protect public health in 
the U.S. without a complete exclusion of asylum 
seekers. Applicants could be interviewed under 
safe-distancing conditions or by remote means, 
tested for COVID-19 and quarantined under 
humanitarian conditions if necessary. Healthy 
asylum seekers could be released under bond or 
with electronic monitoring, pending resolution 
of their cases. One of the worst ironies of stig-
matizing Central American asylum seekers as 
disease bearers is that Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Honduras did not have the coronavirus until 
it was imported from the United States through 
deportations.11 
It is the Trump Administration’s detention and 
deterrence policies that created a public health 
crisis among asylum seekers which the govern-
ment now seeks to use as a pretext for barring 
desperate people. International human rights 
treaties allow for some restrictions of rights 
during a “state of emergency,” but rights limita-
tions should be strictly tailored to the emergency 
as necessary and effective. Certain rights, such as 
the right to be free from torture and the right to 
life are never to be restricted.12 
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Migration and Mobility in an Age of Pandemic 
James F. Hollifield |  Southern Methodist University
International migration has been steadily increas-
ing since the end of the Second World War. In 
2019, approximately 272 million people resided 
outside of their country of birth for one year or 
more (barely 3.5 percent of the world’s popula-
tion).1 Until the global pandemic of 2020, tens 
of millions of people crossed borders on a dai-
ly basis, which added up to roughly two billion 
border crossings per year. Human mobility was 
part of a broader trend of globalization, includ-
ing trade in goods and services, investments and 
capital flows, greater ease of travel, and a veri-
table explosion of information. The COVID-19 
pandemic puts all of these trends into question, as 
states move to close their borders and to stop mi-
gration in its tracks, posing the biggest challenge 
to the international ‘liberal’ order since the 1930s 
and the Second World War. Could the pandemic 
be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, putting 
an end to roughly seventy years of globalization, 
and bringing down the international liberal or-
der itself? The legal and institutional edifice of 
globalization was under stress even before the 
pandemic. Now, however, reactionary populist 
politicians, like Donald Trump, are moving even 
faster further to undermine the foundations of 
the global order.
Like trade and foreign investment, migration 
has been a defining feature of globalization, and 
until the pandemic of 2020 human mobility was 
taken for granted, especially in the wealthier 
(OECD) countries of the northern hemisphere. 
Migration and mobility were in many ways con-
nected to trade and investment, yet they are pro-
foundly different. People are not shirts, which is 
another way of saying that labor is not a pure 
commodity. Unlike goods and capital, individuals 
become actors on the international stage whether 
through peaceful transnational communities or 
violent terrorist and criminal networks. Migra-
tion and mobility can be a threat to the securi-
ty of states, and during a time of pandemic, the 
movement of people can endanger public health. 
This is especially true when foreign workers are 
concentrated in production-line work (like meat-
packing in the United States) or confined in dor-
mitories, in crowded conditions and closed quar-
ters, as in Singapore and in the oil sheikdoms of 
the Persian Gulf. 
Yet migration is vital for human and economic 
development, and it reduces global inequalities.2 
Essential industries like healthcare and food pro-
duction rely heavily on immigrant labor, skilled 
and unskilled, while remittances remain a vital 
source of foreign exchange and investment in 
many developing countries. Immigrants bring 
much needed labor and human capital, new ideas 
and cultures, and in liberal democracies, they 
come with a basic package of (human and civil) 
rights that enables them to settle and become pro-
ductive members of society. Conversely, they may 
return to their countries of origin where they can 
have a dramatic impact on economic and political 
development.3 
Foreign workers (documented and undocu-
mented) and refugees play a vital role in essential 
services in the fight against COVID-19, wheth-
er in health care, agriculture and food process-
ing, transportation, delivery, freight, and cargo. 
Even Trump with his emphasis on nativist and 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies, chose to exempt 
seasonal and farm labor from his immigration 
ban, recognizing that US food supplies are depen-
dent on continued access to foreign labor. Trump 
also invoked the Defense Production Act to order 
meatpacking plants to remain open despite high 
levels of infection among the largely immigrant 
workforce. 
Not all migration is voluntary – in any given 
year, tens of millions of people move to escape 
political violence, hunger, and deprivation, be-
coming refugees, asylum seekers, or internally dis-
placed persons. In 2019, the number of “persons 
of concern” to the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees was 70.8 million, including 26 
million refugees, 3.5 million asylum seekers, and 
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41.3 million internally displaced people. Wars in 
the Middle East (especially Syria and Iraq), East 
and West Africa, and instability in South Asia (Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan) and Central (Northern 
Triangle) and South America (Venezuela) continue 
to feed a growing population of forced migrants. 
Because it is so complex and multi-faceted, migra-
tion of all types poses a challenge for nation-states, 
for regions like the European Union and North 
America, and for the international community 
as a whole (Hollifield and Foley forthcoming).4 
These populations are incredibly exposed, highly 
vulnerable to infection, and with little access to 
basic sanitation and health care. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened 
the hand of populist leaders, like Donald Trump, 
Matteo Salvini, and Victor Orban, who want to 
close their societies to migrants and refugees, 
ignoring the rule of law and international legal 
commitments under the refugee convention. The 
‘defection’ of the United States in particular from 
multilateral organizations, like the WHO, will ac-
celerate beggar-thy-neighbor policies, making in-
ternational cooperation to combat the pandemic 
far more difficult, prolonging human suffering, 
and increasing global inequalities.
America First and the ‘End of Liberalism’
In the first three years of his administration, Pres-
ident Donald Trump made good on his campaign 
pledges. He issued executive orders banning im-
migrants and visitors from many Muslim-ma-
jority countries. He focused on border security, 
illegally reallocating funds from the defense bud-
get to extend the border wall—a hugely symbolic 
move for his electoral base. He slashed the num-
ber of refugees allowed into the U.S and made 
every effort to stop asylum seeking along the 
southern border. As a deterrence, he authorized 
the separation of migrant families at the border, 
ripping small children from the arms of their par-
ents, eventually striking a deal with Mexico to 
push back all asylum seekers at the border, with-
out giving them a hearing—a flagrant violation 
of international law. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has allowed Trump to consolidate his nativist 
agenda, effectively sealing the southern border, 
while suspending refugee admissions as well as 
legal immigration, the latter for a period of sixty 
days.5 US consulates worldwide stopped issuing 
visas on 20 March 2020. 
Trump’s immigration and refugee policy is 
couched in ‘civilizational’ terms6, pitting Chris-
tians and Jews against Muslims and Mexicans/
Hispanics against whites and blacks. With the 
economic implosion and soaring unemployment 
in the wake of the pandemic, Trump has vowed 
to close the US labor market to immigrants to 
‘save American jobs.’ The pandemic has created a 
perfect storm of cultural, economic, and security 
threats in the U.S. At the domestic level, the nativ-
ist policy shift contributes to an environment of 
intolerance and intimidation in which hate crimes 
have increased,7 giving succor to violent, right-
wing, extremist groups. At the international level, 
Trump’s beggar-thy-neighbor policies have alien-
ated allies and stifled international cooperation.
Trump is making US foreign and security 
policy through naked appeals to nationalism, 
racism, and xenophobia, ignoring long-term na-
tional interests, and undermining multilateralism. 
Symbolic politics is the order of the day. While 
nationalism and scapegoating migrants and refu-
gees appeal directly to Trump’s base and are a vi-
tal part of his 2020 reelection strategy, long-term 
foreign policy and security interests are sacrificed 
for the short-term electoral high that comes from 
nationalism, nativism and symbolic politics. The 
need for allies and international cooperation to 
combat COVID-19 and for practical solutions to 
refugee and humanitarian crises is off the foreign 
policy agenda, and the defection of the U.S. from 
multilateral regimes weakens the global order.
Conclusion
Migration is both a cause and a consequence of 
political and economic change, and, like trade, it 
is a fundamental feature of the postwar liberal 
order. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has led 
states to close their borders, disrupting supply 
chains, and severely curtailing migration and mo-
bility. If the pandemic leads to further closure of 
societies and economies and to more nationalism, 
the international system will descend into greater 
anarchy, disorder and war. Human and econom-
ic development will suffer and global inequalities 
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will rise. The more powerful states, like the U.S. 
and China, will set the trend for the rest of the 
world, and in both states, nationalism has surged 
to the fore, setting the stage for more conflict as 
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